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The proposed restructure of Fiji’s sugar industry has the
potential to change fundamentally the incentives facing
stakeholders and their interaction. How well the stated
objective of ‘unity in purpose’ is achieved will depend on
whether the causes of the current land conflict are
addressed and whether the established decision-making
process can help build trust, transparency and
accountability. Ultimately, the success of the proposed
industry restructure may depend on the commitment of
Fijian landowners and the Fijian administration to review
the way returns are shared among stakeholders.
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The Fijian sugar industry is facing major
challenges, including declining productivity,
deteriorating transport and processing
infrastructure, declining sugarcane quality,
and declining sugar recovery rate (Sugar
Commission of Fiji 1997). The roots of many
of these problems can be found in past and
current industry structure (Box 1).
These elements include an institutional
arrangement based on a prescriptive Master
Award and land leasing system which
encouraged an adversarial relationship
among the stakeholders. Each stakeholder
group—the mill workers’ unions, transport
workers’ union, sugarcane growers’ unions
and associations and the landowners—is
‘scrambling to secure “their fair share” of a
crumbling and shrinking pie’ (Sugar Industry
Proposal 1999). The current structure includes
a payment system which has little or no
commercial basis and which does not provide
incentives to reward those who work towards
improving productivity and quality.
According to the industry’s own assessment,
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
80
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 18 Number 1 May 2003 © Asia Pacific Press
it is too bureaucratic and legalistic (see
Moynagh 1981; Lal 1992, 1997).
To address this apparent lack of unity of
purpose among key stakeholders, the sugar
industry has developed a proposal to provide
key interest groups with a more effective stake
in the operation of the industry. Essentially,
the new structure is expected to provide
incentives for stakeholders, in particular the
landowners, the growers and the millers, to
cooperate in developing the industry rather
than compete over shrinking resources.
Origins of current land conflicts
Conflict over land is nothing new to Fiji.
Tensions and disagreements over land go
back at least to the early days of European
settlement in the 1800s. The origins of the
present conflict, however, can be found in
the indigenous land ownership and
management system introduced in Fiji
during the colonial era, in subsequent
legislation, and in misperceptions and
misinformation about leases, lease rents and
the profitability of sugarcane farming.
The present land ownership and
management system is a creation of the British
colonial government under Sir Arthur
Gordon (1875–80). To prevent alienation of
Fijian land, the government legislated that
custom-held land could not be bought or sold,
even among Fijians themselves (France 1969).
Although land was owned by individuals,
Box 1
Key elements of Fiji’s sugar industry structure
• A single processing firm, the Fiji Sugar Corporation, operates four mills on the two
main islands, Vanua Levu and Viti Levu.
• Rain-fed sugar sugarcane is grown mainly on small farms.
• Land is leased on terms and conditions stipulated in the Agricultural Landlord and
Tenant’s Act (ALTA).
• Most sugarcane is grown on land leased from indigenous Fijians who own 92 per
cent of land that is inalienable.
• Leases are negotiated with the Native Land Trust Board acting as custodians on
behalf of the traditional owners.
• Leases are issued by the Native Land Trust Board, often without landowner consent.
• The sugarcane payment system is based on sugarcane yield, not on the quality of sugarcane
supplied to the mills.
• A prescriptive Master Award under the Sugar Industry Act 1984 which stipulates
key industry activities including
— planting and cultivation of sugarcane by registered growers
— harvesting and delivery mode of sugarcane to the Fiji Sugar Corporation
— sale and purchase of sugarcane under quota to the Fiji Sugar Corporation
— establishment and incorporation of the sugarcane harvesting process
— the manufacture, storage, marketing, delivery and sale of sugar and by-products
— the sharing of the sugar price between the processor and growers and the
manner and timing of sugarcane payments
— the manner in which industry-related disputes can be settled by the Sugar
Industry Tribunal.
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families, clans or other higher levels of
communal aggregation, ownership was
highly flexible and dynamic and land often
changed hands (Ward 1995). In an effort to
simplify the colony’s management, the
colonial government created over time a highly
rigid ownership system that entrenched non-
alienation and vested ownership primarily
in the mataqali.1 Even today, this system sits
uneasily with the Fijians and is partly
responsible for the discontent among Fijian
landowners about the use and management
of their land (Rakai et al. 1995; Ravuvu 1983;
Nayacakalou 1971).
Following European settlement,
demands for productive land for expansion
of various primary industries required the
settlers to deal with individual landowners
in areas remote from the main areas of
settlement. A land tenure system was created
whereby land could be leased for a 25-year
period. However, European farmers had
three main complaints: the 25-year leases
were too short to justify major investments;
the 1880 Ordinance did not allow
landowners to pay compensation to the
tenant when the land reverted to them; and
the leasing process was daunting, involving
personal approaches to the mataqali heads,
applications to district heads and councils,
and payment of ‘bribes’ (France 1969). In
1916, a Native Land Ordinance was passed
which required all land to be leased by the
government for a period of 25 years with the
possibility of an extension for another 10
years. Under this Ordinance, Fijian
landowners were required to pay
compensation to the lessee for improvements
in the case of non-renewal of the lease—a
condition which Fijian landowners were
unhappy about.
To bring a semblance of stability to the
leasing of land and to minimise the
transaction costs of dealing with individual
mataqalis, as well as simplifying the process,
in 1940 the government created the monopoly
Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) under the
Native Land Trust Act (NLTA). The Act gave
the NLTB sole control over custom-held land,
and this facilitated dealings between the then
major agriculturists—the Colonial Sugar
Refinery (CSR) and Indian Fijian growers—
and the indigenous owners. However, the
NLTB is not obliged to consult with
landowners about renewal or issuance of
leases, a practice which continues to
contribute to the conflict over land.
The NLTB issues and renews leases,
collects rents, takes 25 per cent of the rent
income for administration and pays heads
of the land-owning units 22.5 per cent of
the gross rent collected (Kamikamica and
Davey 1988).2 The rest is divided among the
members of the land-owning units, who may
number from a few hundred to more than
1,000. The returns to individual landowners
thus vary considerably.
The powers of the NLTB were retained
under the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant
Act (ALTA) introduced in 1976 to rationalise
the leasing of Crown, Native and Freehold
land for agricultural purposes. Two main
features of ALTA have been central to the
conflict: the stipulated rental amount and the
length of lease. The rental amount was fixed
under ALTA at 6 per cent of the unimproved
capital value (UCV), with a mandatory
reassessment of the UCV every five years by a
committee of valuers appointed by the
government. Second, all leases granted under
ALTA since 1 September 1977 were to be for a
minimum of 30 years. The holders of leases
granted before this date (the great majority of
which were for a term of ten years under
ALTA’s predecessor the Agricultural
Landlord and Tenant Ordinance) were
entitled to a single extension of 20 years under
ALTA. As a result a majority of the leases began
to expire from 1997, with landowners
generally unwilling to renew them.
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Non-renewal of leases
Despite extensive dialogue between the then
major political parties representing the two
ethnic communities, the Soqosoqo no Vakavulewa
ni Taukei (SVT) for the Fijians and the National
Federation Party (NFP) representing the
IndoFijians, not much progress was made. An
ALTA Task Force was established, involving
key representatives from the SVT and NFP, the
NLTB and the Sugar Cane Growers Council,
with the primary objective of resolving the land
issue. The deadlock over ALTA could not be
overcome, partly because of the extent of the
disagreement between the two groups resulting
from misunderstandings and incomplete
information available to those involved.
Indian Fijians, who are the main lessees,
and the Fiji sugar industry that depends on
sugarcane farming on largely custom land,
want the Government to retain ALTA.3
However, the NLTB in its response noted
[a]ny attempt by Government to
implement this proposition will
demonstrate Government’s insensitivity
towards the realities of the landowners
and tenants particularly within the
sugarcane belt, (and) the effects this will
have on the sugar industry and Fiji’s
economy. We say this because, many
more tenants will be subjected to eviction
from the sugarcane belt as is the current
practice (NLTB 1999).
Of the total 11,293 sugarcane leases
formally recorded by NLTB, a total of 3,323
leases expired between 1997 and 2001. By
the end of 2006 another 2,131 are expected
to expire. The proportion of leases expiring
by 2006 will be greater (almost 88 per cent)
once the Crown Schedule A and B lands
have been transferred to indigenous Fijians,
following a recent government decision
(Reddy and Lal 2002). So far over 70 per
cent of the expired leases have not been
reissued to existing tenants.
Reasons for non renewal
The reasons for non-renewal given by the
landowners are several. Some are valid while
others are based on misinformation or
incomplete data. Four reasons commonly
cited include
• landowners’ desire to recover some of
their land for use by the mataqali members
• a desire on the part of the landowners to
participate in commercial agriculture
• inequitable sharing of the ‘subsidy’
received by Fiji under the various
preferential market access arrangements
• past rents were too low and the necessity
to charge a ‘market rent’ (higher rent) for
their land.
The first two reasons are related, with
landowners wanting to regain control of their
land for subsistence or commercial uses.
Land needed for own use
Giving the NLTB sole responsibility over
matters related to native land effectively took
all control out of the hands of the
landowners. This has been a major source of
discontent among the landowners for two
main, but related, reasons (Rakai et al. 1995).
First, often the best pieces of their land are
leased out under ALTA. Second, it is
understandable that as indigenousFijian
aspirations change they, too, may wish to
engage in commercial agriculture.
However, the requirements of each land-
owning unit need to be carefully examined.
Even where land is needed for their own use,
it is unclear whether 100 per cent of the leased
land needs to be repossessed, as apparently
indicated by many land-owning units. An
assessment of ‘need’ can be made in terms of
the proportion of land currently not leased
to total land owned by, or the size of, the land-
owning unit. It is possible that some land-
owning units, such as the Naduta and
Savanaura (Nakama) land-owning unit in
the Wailevu, leased 100 per cent of their
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arable land (Lal and Rita 2003). In some
cases, although the majority of the land may
have been leased, the need for land to revert
back to the land-owning units may not be as
acute as has been implied, because the rural
population is declining, with many more
Fijians residing in urban areas.
A desire to enter sugarcane farming is
also often given as the reason for the
landowners not wanting to renew the leases.
This is understandable, as the sugar
industry is the source of the largest
commodity export income for Fiji. During
the period 1997–99, 74 per cent of the
expired leases were either issued to
members of mataqali, or put in reserve; that
is, only 26 per cent of the expired leases were
renewed. This may reflect a desire on the
part of indigenousFijians to take up
sugarcane farming. These statistics,
however, need to be considered cautiously
because the number of leases issued to
members of the land-owning units may
reflect to some extent the effect of the
government’s policy to grant F$10,000 to
every Fijian who took up sugarcane farming.
The grant amount is greater than the total
rent that some landowners could expect to
receive in their lifetime, as the following
quote from the head of the NLTB, Maika
Qarikau,4 indicates
…imagine if all your land is leased by
other people who are receiving some
F$10,000 gross income and you get only,
say, about F$250 as your gross income
from that lease. And you have to share
that with the NLTB which deducts 30
per cent and then 5 per cent goes to the
Turanga-ni-Taukei, 10 per cent goes to
Turaqa-ni-Yavusa, 15 per cent to the
Turaga-ni-Mataqali, you are left with
peanuts (Fiji Times, 9 August 1997:7).
There have been reports of Fijians
registering an interest in sugarcane farming
(Fiji Post, 23 November 2000), only to receive
the grant and not to enter sugarcane farming.
In some cases, previously productive
sugarcane fields now leased to members of
land-owning units have been allowed to
revert to bush. The extent of this is not known.
Inequitable sharing of subsidies
Another major reason given for not renewing
leases is the Fijian landowners’ concern that
they have not received any direct benefit from
the subsidy received from the European
Union. This sentiment is summarised by  the
then Interim Prime Minister, Laidenia Qarase.
The tenants have benefited greatly
from their leased native land. For
example, in the period of the Lome
Convention between the European
Union and the African, Caribbean and
Pacific countries, from 1975 to 1999,
total earnings of Fiji from its sugar
exports to the European Union under
the Convention’s Sugar Protocol were
estimated at F$3.5 billion. About half
of this comprised premium from the
high EU sugar prices compared to
world free market sugar prices. In the
sugar industry in Fiji, this F$3.5 billion
is shared 30 per cent to the millers, Fiji
Sugar Corporation, and 70 per cent to
the farmers, more than 75 per cent of
whom are tenants of Fijian-owned
land. But not a bit of that windfall
F$3.5 billion is shared directly [with]
the Fijian landowners (Qarase 2000).
It is true that the Fijian landowners have
not directly received a share of the European
Union subsidy. It is, however, likely that they
would not have been able to obtain the
current level of rent had the industry not
received the higher prices for sugar. The rent
is a function of the present value of the
expected net returns from the use of the land
(Barlowe 1972). ALTA restricts the rental
amount that can be levied to 6 per cent of the
unimproved capital value (UCV). The UCV
is supposed to reflect the potential
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agricultural productivity of the land and the
‘purpose for which the land is issued and
not the actual use of the land or any other
purpose for which the land could be used’
(ALTA S21(3)). The UCV has been revised
upwards three times since the first valuation
in 1977, with the most recent revision in 1997
(Table 1). Although the rent has remained at
6 per cent of UCV, the rental amount paid
has increased in both nominal and real terms
(Lal et al. 2001a).
Without the high sugar prices, the
‘market value’ and the UCV, of sugarcane
land would have been much lower than what
it is currently and the landowners would
have received even much lower rental
amounts. Government revenue has also been
increased by the preferential sugar prices
through the taxes collected, in particular the
3 per cent export tax.5
Low rent
Members of some landowning units are
correct in saying that the rental amount
received is small. Nationally, on average
about 3.4 per cent of the gross value of
sugarcane has been paid in rent. The rent
may be thought of as low in two senses. First,
the amount received is low because of the
biophysical characteristics of land in Fiji.
Less than one per cent of land is categorised
as Class I land, producing 85 tonnes per
hectare or more. Under ALTA, lessees would
have paid rent of F$480 per hectare for such
land. Over 90 per cent of land under
sugarcane is poor to marginal (Classes III
and IV), producing less than 50 tonnes per
hectare. For such land, a rental amount of
F$45–150 per hectare is paid. The weighted
average annual rent is estimated at F$92 per
hectare (Lal et al. 2001a).
Second, rent per member is low because
members of a land-owning unit receive only
about 48 per cent of the rent (on average, F$44
per hectare) collected and this amount is
divided among all adults over the age of 18.
The amount of rent received by individual
members, however, varies considerably,
depending on the size of the land-owning unit,
the productivity class of their land, the
proportion of total area of land leased out and
the percentage deducted for the different chiefs
(Lal et al. 2002). Income per member varies
widely, and can range from F$2 to F$3,879.6
Is the rent low by international standards?
The answer to this question depends on
which land is considered and which market
is used for comparison. On average the
current UCV-based rent is equivalent to 10.6
Table 1 Nominal unimproved capital value per hectare for sugarcane growing areas in
Fiji, 1977–97 (F$)
Land classification 1977 1987 1992 1997
First class 500–900 2,700–4,500 6,500 8,000
Second class 200–500 1,650–2,700 4,500 5,000
Third class 85–200 1,100–1,650 2,000 2,500
Marginal class 50–100 300–1,250 750 900
Note: Although land in different regions has different UCV estimates and usually a range of estimates was
reported in the local gazette, since 1992 the lower bound of UCV estimates rather than a range has been reported.
Source: Lal, P.N., Lim-Applegate, H. and Reddy, M., 2001a. ‘Land tenure dilemma in Fiji—can Fijian
landowners and Indo-Fijian tenants have their cake and eat it too?’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 16(2):106–19.
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per cent of the gross value of product for Class
I land and 2.9 per cent for marginal land (Lal
et al. 2001a). These estimates do not include
goodwill payments, New Lease
Consideration (NLC) fees, or premiums
charged by the NLTB and/or the
landowners.7 Total rent received (UCV-based
rent plus the annualised goodwill payment)
is estimated as equivalent to an annual 14
per cent of gross value of product (GVP) for
Class I land; where GVP is equal to price
times the average yield. The total rental
equivalent is estimated at 10 per cent for
marginal land.
These rents are within the range of rental
amounts charged in other countries. Since
joining the European Union, the rent paid in
the United Kingdom has been 10–15 per cent
of GVP (Ravenscroft et al. 1999). In
Queensland the rent charged is 10 per cent
of GVP. Although there is no universally
agreed ‘fair’ rent for agricultural land, the
annual rent paid in Fiji plus annualised
goodwill payments is consistent with these
payments in other countries.
Is there money to be made from
sugarcane farming?
One of the sources of tension is the perception
that sugarcane growers are making a lot of
money (Qarase 2000). Is there a lot of money
to be made in sugarcane farming?
The average net return (as compared
with gross income) per household from
sugarcane farming is F$842 per hectare or
about F$3,500 in total. This estimate is based
on census data on sugarcane harvested and
transported to the Fiji Sugar Corporation, the
sugarcane prices received by growers, and
average cost data provided by Fiji Sugar
Corporation (personal communication
2001). But for 92 per cent of growers, those
who produce 50 tonnes per hectare or less,
the household net income is F$2,000; while
in sectors such as Wainikoro, net income is
negative if family labour is taken into
account. In some cases, farmers are even
making a loss (assuming the average cost
data provided by the Fiji Sugar Corporation
is applicable to the Wainikoro sector). These
averages are below the national per capita
GDP, which was recorded at F$3,889 for 2000.
On the other hand, for growers on Class I
land, their household income from
sugarcane averages about F$7,000 per
annum (Lal et al. 2001a).
As a comparison, a 1997 UNDP study
on poverty in Fiji suggests that rural people
earning less than F$100 a week are
considered to be below the poverty line
(Government of Fiji and UNDP 1999). By that
criterion some 90 per cent of the sugarcane
growers would be considered to be in
poverty. However,  sugarcane growing is not
always the only source of household income,
particularly not around the urban areas.
Nationally, the average income disparity
between the two major ethnic groups is small,
according to UNDP (1999) and income
inequality is greater within each ethnic group
than between groups.
While overall, Fijian households have
the lowest incomes and ‘others’ have
the highest, the lower-income Indo-
Fijian households are worse off than
lower-income Fijian households. Low-
income ‘others’ in rural areas are the
worst off of all. There are more Indo-
Fijian households in the very poorest
section of society, numbering just over
half of all-poor households. They have
an average income 14 per cent lower
than Fijian households. In the highest
bracket, the average income of Indo-
Fijian households is 42 per cent higher
than high-income Fijian households.
Fijians predominate in the middle
income groups. Fijians in urban areas
are relatively the best off. Poverty is in all
communities, not just particular ethnic
groups or sections of the society (Govern-
ment of Fiji and UNDP 1999:Ch 5).
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Renewal of leases
The general belief in the Fijian community is
that the root cause of low rents is the terms
and conditions of leases issued under the
ALTA. It is because of such perceptions that
the NLTB and the Qarase government have
nominally rejected ALTA. In rejecting it, the
NLTB reiterated that the existing Native Land
Trust Act (NLTA) apply and rental rates are
determined by NLTB based on market
conditions. The specific recommendations of
the NLTB are listed in Appendix 1.
According to the NLTB, leasing under
NLTA would give landowners greater
flexibility to charge a more ‘market-based’
rent (see Table 2 for institutional differences
between leases granted under the two pieces
of legislation). ‘Market rent’ in the NLTA is
defined as ‘the annual rent that might
reasonably be expected to be let in the open
market by a willing lessor to a willing lessee’.
However, the term ‘market rent’ has often
been used to imply higher rents (that is,
higher than what is currently received or has
been received in the past). This is evident
from the demand for—in some cases
exorbitant—goodwill payments for short-
term leases. Goodwill payments have ranged
from F$2,000 to F$22,000 per lease, a figure
which seems to have no bearing on the
productivity of those lands or the size of the
leased area (Lal et al. 2001a). Thus, one could
argue that the reason why NLTA is preferred
Table 2 Differences in institutional arrangements under ALTA and NLTA
Terms and conditions ALTA Proposed under NLTA
Lease tenure Minimum 30 years Rolling 5, 10, 15, 20, and 30 years
(de facto maximum)
Basis of rent fixation 6 per cent unimproved Market rent and a percentage of
capital value (UCV) production
Renewability Non-renewable beyond 30 Renewable subject to NLTB’s
year maximum/minimum consent.
Recently proposed to be renewable
with additional goodwill payment
to NLTB as well as to the
landowners.
At expiry—compensation Value of improvements Compensation to be paid for by
payable by landowners if the government
approved by NLTB
Choice of land utilisation Tenant Stipulated in ALTA
Subletting/sharecropping Illegal, although common Possible, but with NLTB’s
permission
Settlement of disputes By the Agricultural Tribunal By an Independent Arbitration;
a Land Court has recently been
proposed.
Source: Lal, P.N., Lim-Applegate, H. and Reddy, M. 2001a. ‘Land tenure dilemma in Fiji—can Fijian
landowners and Indo-Fijian tenants have their cake and eat it too?’, Pacific Economic Bulletin, 16(2):106–19.
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to ALTA is that there is greater scope to extract
rents that are higher than ‘market rent’ under
ALTA, that is, monopoly rent.
Even if land were issued under NLTA
and higher rents were charged, the issue of
the ‘low rent’ received by members of certain
land-owning units cannot be resolved, given
the communal land-ownership system, the
proportion of rent deducted by the NLTB, and
the amounts claimed by different chiefs. Even
if the amount of rent were to be doubled or
increased ten-fold, the share received per
member would still be very small because
the rental income would be divided among
all individuals over the age of 18 registered
in the land-owning unit.
To the growers and the Fiji Sugar
Corporation, NLTA is not acceptable because
of the key conditions, many uncertainties and
limited protection. In their submission, the
industry suggested that for the industry to
survive and prosper, lessees need longer term
leases with reasonable rentals; require
reasonable advance notice periods before the
expiry of their tenancy; require protection by
legislation against unreasonable rental
increases and other charges; and require fair
compensation for improvements upon expiry
of a lease (Sugar Commission of Fiji 1999).
In many instances, the NLTB was
willing to offer residential leases but not
leases over farming land. This offer was
rejected by some growers in the hope of
receiving the F$28,000 cash grant then on
offer by the Chaudhary Government. While
the offer produced considerable kudos for
the People’s Coalition Government, not
many people actually received the money
because the assessment of applications itself
became highly politicised.
During the period 1997 to 2001, a total
of 3,323 leases expired, of which only 883
were reissued to sitting tenants as sugarcane
land.8 Residential leases on smaller pieces
of land accounted for a further 174 leases
granted to sitting tenants. The remainder
reverted to landowners for their own use or
the leases were issued to indigenous Fijian
tenants (Table 3).
Prospects for future lease renewals are
uncertain. Nor is it known how many ex-
tenants have entered into informal vakavanua
arrangements on land returned to the
landowners or placed in reserve. Terms and
conditions for vakavanua leases are directly
negotiated with the landowners and the rent
is paid directly to them, thus bypassing the
NLTB. The extent of vakavanua leasing is not
known since the NLTB does not keep records
of this activity (personal communication,
March 2002). Records of the Fiji Sugar
Corporation prior to 1997 suggest that on
average between 1993 and 1996, 5 per cent
of all sugarcane land was under vakavanua
lease. Today the proportion could be more
significant if earlier experience is any
indication. In 1988 about 72 per cent of
tobacco-growing land was recorded to be
under the vakavanua system (Eaton 1988).
In the sugarcane belt area there are thus
three different types of leases and four
different forms of agreement (Table 4) issued
by the NLTB, as well as vakavanua.
Perceptions and reality
This discussion highlights the differences
between fact, perceptions and fiction. It is
possible that much of the conflict over land
has arisen because of the differences in
perceptions between the two ethnic
communities, not to mention political
differences. To reduce the scope of the
seemingly escalating conflict over land
experienced elsewhere in the world, it has
been suggested that sharing of information,
convergence of understanding, and
identification and development of
collaborative solutions are essential. It is
important to create an ‘awareness of
interdependence’ among stakeholders as
well as a ‘unity of purpose…if conflict is to
be overcome’ (Buckles and Rusnak 2000:5).
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Industry restructure
The key intention behind the proposed
industry restructure is to provide a unifying
mechanism among the stakeholder groups—
the growers, landowners and the mill
workers—to encourage the desired ‘unity of
purpose’. This, it is hoped, will ensure that
decisions made by them will be based on
commercial considerations and for the
common good, not just in their respective
interests. The goals driving the proposal
include
• long-term business sustainability based
on world’s best practice
• market-based commercial relationships
among all stakeholders and suppliers of
inputs and services
• maximising returns to shareholders.
To encourage unity of purpose, the
company currently operating the four mills—
Lautoka, Labasa, Penang and Raviravi—is
to be split into four separate companies
established around each sugar mill. The
government is to buy out existing company
shareholders and to transfer all assets to the
new companies free of charge. Each
stakeholder group around each mill
catchment area will have a share in the
company. The suggestion is to grandfather
the current stakeholders, growers,
landowners and mill workers, and to provide
them with free shares in the company. The
‘ownership’ is to be shared among the key
stakeholder groups, with the growers to
receive 65–75 per cent, the landowners 5–10
per cent, mill employees 5–10 per cent, and
the rest to the government, whose shares
would be phased out in the long run and
distributed among the other stakeholders.
The argument put forward by the
industry at the meeting in Seqaqa sector (7
February 2002), is that a stakeholder-based
company would ensure that the
shareholders will have the common goal of
maximising returns on their respective
shares, thus increasing the profitability of the
industry. Each stakeholder will, they argue,
also try to increase the cost effectiveness of
their own activities or services along the
production chain.
Under this proposal stakeholders,
particularly the landowners and growers,
are expected to have financial incentives to
ensure the sugar industry prospers, and not
just be concerned about receiving a ‘fair’
return on their inputs. Experience elsewhere
suggests that this is not likely to happen if
the fundamental causes of the current
Table 3 Number of expired leases reissued to sitting tenants for sugarcane and
residential uses
Expiry year Expired sugarcane leases New sugarcane leases issued New residential leases issued
1997 72 67 (36) 23 (8)
1998 157 152 (45) 61 (7)
1999 1,073 861 (350) 297 (83)
2000 1,708 780 (311) 132 (26)
2001 313 155 (141) 15 (50)
Total 3,323 2,015 (883) 297 (174)
Note: Figures in parentheses are for leases issued to sitting tenants.
Source: NLTB data supplied to the sugar industry, 15 March 2002.
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conflict over land—arising from perceptions
of unfair distribution of benefits from the
sugar industry—are not addressed as the
new institutional structure is negotiated.
Stakeholder capitalism
A stakeholder-based company is built on
the philosophy of stakeholding, which is
about creating a change in culture, and
‘changing the way people think’ (Darling
1997:16) about each other, about their
respective interests and their joint interests.
It is built on a culture of ‘constructive
ownership’. The stakeholder approach
includes a commitment to
• a partnership between stakeholders who
have obligations as well as rights
• a framework of reciprocal rights, which
generates expectations that each side will
seek to advance the interests of the other
• building long-term, cooperative re-
lationships based on mutual trust
• a view that stakeholders are not mere
sources of factors of production but are
genuine partners in the venture,
pursuing a common goal
• a common goal of maximising not only
company profits but also the welfare of
each stakeholder group (Parkinson 1997;
Hutton 1997).
Industry restructure and creation of
mutual trust
The central challenge in Fiji is thus to design
a new industry structure which provides
sufficient property rights (decision rights) for
each stakeholder group such that they have
appropriate incentives to work towards a
common good without losing out on
efficiency. Trust and long-term relationships
cannot be legislated, nor can they be built
when there are differences in perceptions and
beliefs, as is currently the case between
landowners and sugarcane growers and
between the two ethnic groups (Williamson
1997). At the core of landowners’ concerns
is the feeling that tenants have become rich
at their expense. Although the facts suggest
otherwise, nonetheless the perception of
unfairness exists and it must be addressed.
Table 4 Proportion of ALTA and non-ALTA leasesa issued under different agreement
types (excluding vakavanua leases)
Agricultural non-ALTA leases ALTA Reserve Total (per cent)
Registered lease 26 2,671 41 24
Tenancy at will 73 26 45 1
Instrument of tenancy 23 4,006 18 36
Agreement for lease 47 38 1,230 12
Memorandum of lease 33 2,825 186 27
Unspecified 1 2 2 0.04
Total number of leases 203 9,568 1,522 11,293b
Percentage of total leases 2 85 13 100
a Expired and current leases in the NLTB database of March 2002. In some cases, people with expired leases
would have obtained residential leases which are not included above.
b This figure is the total number of leases.
Source: Native Land Trust Board data (personal communication, 13 March 2002).
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To overcome such perceptions, at least
two main issues need to be resolved as far as
the landowners and growers are concerned:
the initial distribution of shares among
stakeholders, and the negotiation of the land
lease and ‘market’ rent system. Furthermore,
a decision-making system needs to be put in
place which will create a forum that can help
build trust rather than conflict.
Distribution of shares between
landowners and growers
Distribution of new entitlements without any
costs to the stakeholders is an equity not an
economic issue. There are many different
ways new ‘ownership’ rights can be
distributed: for example, they can be
auctioned, grandfathered, issued on a ‘first-
come, first-served’ basis, or allocated by
lottery. Different mechanisms have different
distributional implications and imply
potentially different levels of transactions
costs (Cullen 1985). An auctioning system is
appropriate if efficiency is the main issue as it
ensures that those best able to use the rights
will hold them. Auctioning, however, could
result in inequitable distribution of shares,
particularly to Indian Fijian growers, who are
more likely to be able to afford to bid for the
shares. ‘First-come, first-served’ and
allocation by lottery may be used in situations
where the new right is to a one-off event and
the demand is not large relative to supply; if
the demand is high then the transaction cost
could be significant, particularly when
growers and the land owners are
geographically dispersed. Where prior rights
or some entitlements already exist,
grandfathering would be perceived as
equitable. Since equity is the main issue in the
Fiji sugar industry, grandfathering of existing
stakeholder groups would thus appear most
acceptable and cost effective; grandfathering
may, however, not be acceptable to those who
are not in the industry and thus would not
gain from the new rights.
Allocation of rights can influence what
the different stakeholder groups ‘feel’ about
each other and the company. Equal
ownership in a company by the key
stakeholder groups could give a sense of
equal partnership (between groups) and
could be critical if the current perception of
inequity is to be overcome. This would mean
that of the total number of shares created for
each mill area company, each stakeholder
group—growers, mill workers and
landowners—would be assigned an equal
proportion of shares, not highly unequal
shares as currently proposed.
Each member of a stakeholder group
could then be assigned an equal share in their
stakeholder group share. It is noted, that
through grandfathering of groups, equity at
the group level may be achieved, but not
necessarily equity between members within
groups of different sizes.
Published theoretical literature on
practical experiences with stakeholder-
based companies are limited. Experience
with employee share schemes and employee
share ownership plans in the United
Kingdom suggests that the success of
stakeholder-based companies depends on
members’ ‘sense of ownership’ (Pendleton
1997:176). Economic success would
ultimately depend on the efficiency gains this
sense of ownership generates, and by the
extent to which stakeholders feel they have
an effective say in decision making. This
would suggest that each stakeholder group
should have equal representation on the
decision-making board of the company.
While this issue of board representation has
not yet been tackled by the Fiji sugar industry,
it is important that any new institutional
arrangement in Fiji adequately addresses it.
As equity among the groups is one of the
key issues in the industry, the overall stake
in the company would, however, need to
remain the same for each stakeholder group,
at least in the short to medium term. This
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would mean that the company profits would
be initially divided three ways in equal
proportion and group shares would remain
constant. In the long run it is possible that
landowners may increase their proportion
of shares as they purchase largely Indian
Fijian shares and become directly involved
in sugarcane farming.
Within each stakeholder group, the group
dividend would be divided among its
members according to an agreed formula. A
system for sharing dividends among members
would still need to be negotiated even if the
industry decides to divide the shares using
the formula under the proposed restructure.
Ideally for the landowners, the dividend
would be divided among the land-owning units
according to their proportion of land of different
quality leased in the mill area. To determine the
proportion of land of different qualities, the
industry could use the land quality database
currently being developed. Alternatively, the
dividend could be divided in proportion to the
rent received for their land, but only if a more
market-oriented rental system is put in place.
Such a system would provide an appropriate
incentive to the land-owning units, assuming
they were consulted by the NLTB, to increase
their holdings of good quality land.
Individual dividends within a land-
owning unit will vary with time as changes
occur in the membership of the group due to
births, deaths and the number of individuals
reaching 18. Such changes are recorded in the
Vola ni Kawa Bula maintained by the Fijian
Affairs Board. With increases in the
indigenous Fijian population, it is likely that
returns to individual landowners will decline
over time, unless there is a more rapid increase
in the profitability of the industry. Given recent
industry performance, and the expected loss
in preferential access, the latter is highly
unlikely to occur in the short to medium term,
with or without industry restructure.
Similarly, to provide the appropriate
incentive to the growers, the dividend would
ideally be divided among growers according
to their share of total sugar produced in their
mill area. Thus, the higher the individual
sugar output from their sugarcane, the larger
the share of grower dividend. This can occur
if the industry adopts a system of sugarcane
quality payment and records the amount of
sugar, as compared with the quantity of
sugarcane, produced by each grower.9 If the
industry retains sugarcane payment on
weight rather than quality of sugarcane
delivered, a second-best option would be to
divide the dividend according to quantity of
sugarcane delivered.
Furthermore, for efficiency reasons,
grower entitlements need to be divisible and
transferable, allowing membership of the
grower-group to change. To achieve this, an
institutional arrangement would need to be
put in place which would allow for the
transfer of individual entitlements as
growers sell their supply contracts and exit
the industry. Similar transferability of land-
owning unit entitlements is also critical, if
land-owning units are to be allowed
flexibility in their decisions about the leasing
of land for sugarcane farming.
In the case of the mill workers, where no
such unit of input can be readily determined,
or costs effectively monitored, the dividend
could be shared equally. When a mill worker
leaves the industry, essentially his/ her share
in the industry ceases, though the group
share remains intact.
In conclusion, the proposed stakeholder-
based company arrangement could help
create a sense of fairness among the
stakeholder groups as well as provide
appropriate incentives, increasing industry
efficiency, provided related institutional
issues are also addressed.
Negotiation of land leases and rents
If a stable, long-term relationship is to be
developed between landowners and growers
within each mill catchment area, a market-
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based, land leasing system is required. The
industry recognises the need for this. In their
restructure proposal, the industry asks the
landowners to ‘support [and introduce]
commercially based contractual arrangements
which reflect the land tenure and investment
requirements of the industry’ (Sugar
Commission of Fiji 1999:7). A commercially
based system would closely reflect market
supply and demand of land.
Under competitive market conditions,
land rent reflects the net returns expected
from its best use, as well as risks and
uncertainties. Therefore, the more productive
the land, the more valuable the crop, the
lower the costs, and the lower the
uncertainties, the higher the expected net
returns. The higher the expected
(mathematically)10 net returns, the greater
should be the land price and thus the greater
the annual rental value. The rental value of
land thus should reflect what the tenants are
willing to pay (Barlowe 1972; Pagiola 1999).
However, in Fiji, a market price for
custom-owned land cannot be observed
because land cannot be bought or sold.
Second, a competitive market for land leases
is also not possible because native land is
leased by the custodian for Fijian land, the
NLTB. Land-owning units are not free to
negotiate leases of their land. In the past the
NLTB has also not consulted the land-
owning units before issuing leases on their
land (see Lal et al. 2001a). The NLTB is thus
a monopolist, able to restrict the supply of
land and extract monopoly rents.
As a second-best option, some institu-
tional mechanism, other than the current
UCV-based system, needs to be developed
that allows land rent to change with
changing market conditions of the crops
grown. Given the level of discontentment
over the UCV-based rental amounts, and the
demand by the NLTB and the landowners
for a market rent, a rental system is needed
which can simulate market conditions and
rental amount that reflects expected net
returns—including restricting the monopoly
position of the NLTB.
To move closer to a market condition
where landowners and tenants can
negotiate a market rent, one option is for
land leases to be negotiated separately for
each mill area, allowing for the greatest
degree of flexibility in the types of lease
available. Different models have been
suggested, including the Sugar Cane
Growers’ Council representing the growers
negotiating with the NLTB, representing the
land-owning units; and the stakeholder-
based company taking a head lease and
issuing a supply contract to growers.
The rental formulae negotiated in each
area will depend on whether landowners
and growers are risk averse, risk neutral or
risk takers. In an uncertain environment, risk-
averse tenants would be prepared to forgo
income for more secure average returns. Risk-
averse landowners may feel better off under
a fixed lease since they will not be exposed
to risks (see Lal et al. 2001a).
For commercially-based rent options
which are more responsive to market
forces—instead of fixing rent, land rent
should closely reflect the expected returns
net of all costs, including returns to
management. This would mean that not only
information about gross value of output
should be known but also the costs of
production, harvest and transport (if
transport costs are to be borne by the
growers). While the value of output, rail
transport and harvest costs can be estimated
with certainty because census data on these
factors are collected by the Fiji Sugar
Corporation, reliable production cost
estimates are currently not available.
In the short run, a second-best option
could include the landowners receiving a
fixed percentage of the gross value of product
(GVP). This figure would need to be
negotiated between the landowners and the
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growers. Current average land rents, taking
into account goodwill payments, are
equivalent to 16–20 per cent of the GVP, when
internationally land rent is in the vicinity of
10–14 per cent of GVP (Lal et al. 2001a).
Alternatively, sharecropping may be another
option. However, as noted by Heady (1971)
and Reid (1976), for sharecropping to be
efficient there needs to be an equal
distribution of rewards and costs as well as
risks. They also note that for efficiency it does
not matter what the share ratio between
growers and landowners is—what matters
is that the returns and costs are shared in the
same proportion. Transaction cost of
negotiation and monitoring of tenant activity
in sharecropping should also be low.
Sharecropping has not been considered
as a serious option, partly perhaps because
of its bad reputation of exploitation by
landowners and growers. To avoid
exploitation of the landowners or the growers
(Otsuka et al. 1992) and a loss in efficiency
(see Shaban 1987; Binswanger et al. 1993),
the government could institute a system
clearly defining the parameters within which
sharecropping arrangements can be
negotiated thus protecting both tenants and
landowners.
Similar risk issues are also a concern in
the current land leasing system whereby the
NLTB, and not the land-owning units, enter
into leasing agreements. Many economists,
such as Kasper (2001), have argued for the
decorporatisation of the NLTB, allowing
leasing to occur through a competitive market
situation. However, a recent economic survey
of the growers suggests that this will not
work, at least in the short-to-medium term.
Growers indicated their preference for
leasing land through the NLTB, because of
their fear of land-owning unit members
changing their minds. Growers are also
concerned that if they deal directly with
landowners, there will be demands by
different members of land-owning units for
ongoing additional payments (Lal and
Reddy 2003).
To avoid this kind of ‘sovereign’ risk, and
to minimise transaction costs of negotiation,
the industry has also suggested that each
mill area company could negotiate with the
NLTB representatives of the mill area land-
owning units, and enter into a single land-
lease contract directly with the NLTB. This
will not necessarily resolve the issue of
arriving at market rent unless of course the
land owners are directly consulted by the
NLTB, or are directly part of the negotiating
team. The rental amount would still need to
reflect the marginal value of land in the
sugarcane production.
The advantage of this approach is that
land lease negotiations can be carried out as
a commercial transaction and land is seen
as a factor of production of the final
commodity, sugar, and not as the political
football that it has been in the past. By
allowing individual mill areas to negotiate
their own separate leases, and the
landowners being present during the
negotiations, both parties, the landowners
and the company, will be in a better position
to take into account the local supply and
demand of land as well opportunity cost of
sugarcane growing land. Furthermore, since
landowners would be stakeholders in the
company, they will take into account in their
negotiations their share of the expected
returns from company profit, as well as their
opportunity cost of not leasing land for
sugarcane farming.
The company would then be in a position
to enter into supply contracts with the growers
on terms and conditions that would promote
efficiency in the production sector, including
land rent reflecting the value of marginal
product. To determine rent, a detailed
production cost and production economic
model will be required, or the rental amount
could be based on a percentage of the gross
value of product as mentioned previously.
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Alternatively, the Sugar Cane Grower’s
Council could negotiate on behalf of
growers with the NLTB, together with the
participation of their respective local area
representatives. Once again the transaction
costs could be minimised. However, the
Sugar Cane Grower’s Council will not only
face similar problems to the company
negotiating with the NLTB, the council
model has an additional difficulty. Since the
majority of the growers are Indofijians and
the landowners are Fijians, there is a danger
that ethnic politics may once again dom-
inate land debate. This possibility can,
however, be minimised over time if trust and
a stable long-term relationship can be
encouraged through the new stakeholder-
based company structure.
Regardless of which negotiation model
is adopted, efficiency in the sugarcane
production is unlikely to be realised unless
growers are able to negotiate separate leases
for their home sites. A separate lease for the
home site can encourage growers with better
alternative sources of livelihood to sell their
supply contracts and exit the industry
without putting their homes at risk. This
provides a less political environment for
negotiation with the emotional factor of
losing the home sites removed.
Recently, the NLTB has started to identify
residential sites within an agricultural lease
and charging separate rents for them. Once
the fear of growers losing their house site is
removed, the Sugar Cane Grower’s Council
and the NLTB can negotiate agricultural
lease rentals considering key factors related
to sugarcane farming.
An arrangement that encourages sharing
of information can also increase trans-
parency and help build trust between the
landowners and the growers.
Building trust
Experience in many developing countries,
such as Papua New Guinea (Jones and
McGavin 2001), Indonesia (Fisher 1995), Costa
Rica (Weitzner and Borras 2000) and Honduras
(Chenier, Sherwood and Robertson 2000)
suggests that developing a dialogue between
stakeholders is essential if collaboration and
peaceful resource use and management are to
be achieved. Only through a process that
encourages stakeholder groups to come
together, critically assess the underlying
sources of concerns and share information can
a common understanding and an awareness
of interdependence be achieved.
Therefore, key stakeholders need to be
provided with a detailed analysis of the key
issues, perceptions and/or misconceptions
from the point of view of the landowners and
growers at the local level. Analysis could be
provided and synthesised at the appropriate
unit of aggregation—growers, land-owning
units, or mill catchment area—and presented
to the stakeholders in a user-friendly form.
Specific computer tools and techniques, such
as computer models, decision-support
systems and Geographical Information
Systems (GIS) are available now which can
help provide detailed objective and
integrated analysis of data available from the
NLTB, the Fiji Sugar Corporation and the
Ministry of Agriculture, Sugar and Land
Resettlement. The challenge is to use these,
validate and harmonise the different data
sets and integrate them in a manner that
allows them to be used by all the key
stakeholders to collectively make informed
decisions (see Lal et al. 2002).
A decision-support system (Lal et al.
2001b) is currently being developed as part
of an interdisciplinary project supported by
the Australian Centre for International
Agricultural Research linking the different
databases and analytical modules.
Through an objective assessment of
alternatives, and a commitment to the
stakeholding philosophy, stakeholders
within each mill catchment can arrive at a
solution in their collective interests, and
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within the legislative guidelines protecting
the interests of growers and landowners. The
negotiation process will require some
compromise, while recognising that
stakeholder-based industry is about ‘equality
of opportunity’ and ‘not equality of income’
(Kelly, Kelly and Gamble 1997:243).
Conclusion
While conflict over land in Fiji is not new, it
has escalated in recent years in part because
of the differences in perceptions, wants and
needs of the two ethnic communities,
indigenous Fijians and Indian Fijians, fueled
by the use of incomplete information and
misinformation, as well as political
expediency. If the conflict is to be reduced,
the proposed industry structure aimed at
creating a ‘unity of purpose’ is a necessary
first step. A long-term relationship between
the stakeholders based on mutual trust must
be established.
Trust cannot be legislated. It can develop
only when there is effective communication,
a shared understanding of the problems
from the point of view of all stakeholders,
an understanding of their different interests
and a sense of who is affected by, and who
can influence, the use of the resource. An
equitable and collaborative decision-making
process involving relevant stakeholders,
with the help of objective analysis using the
best information available could assist
enormously.
For stakeholding to work towards
achieving a sense of ‘unity of purpose’, a
change in culture is required. Stakeholders
need to understand that with stakeholding
comes both rights and obligations and that it
is a two-way relationship of interdependence
between the growers and the landowners. As
Ratu Sukuna aptly noted in 1936,
[we] cannot in these days adopt an
attitude that will conflict with the
welfare of those who, like us, wish to
live peacefully and increase the wealth
of the Colony. We are doing our part
here and so are they. We want to live;
they do the same. You should realise
that money causes a close inter-
relationship of interests. If other
communities are poor, we too remain
poor. If they prosper, we also prosper.
But if we obstruct other people without
reason from using our lands, following
laggards there will be no prosperity
(Lal 1992:101).
The success of the stakeholder company
will depend on whether there is a commitment
on the part of the Fijian landowners and the
Fijian administration to review the way rental
income and future returns from the
stakeholder-based company are shared
among the members of the land-owning unit,
the respective chiefs, and the NLTB.
Ultimately, however, the long-term
success of the stakeholder companies will
depend on the viability of sugarcane farming
in a competitive world sugar market, and on
whether Fiji is able to introduce a lease rental
system that is considered to be fair and
equitable and market based. Ideally, what is
required is a system where farmers can freely
negotiate leasing arrangements with the
landowners. However, in the absence of a
competitive land lease market, the challenge
is to design an institutional system in which
the land rent reflects the marginal value of
product in sugarcane farming and that
minimises the prospect of monopoly rent
being extracted by the NLTB.
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Appendix 1
NLTB recommendations to government
• Government, political party leaders and all other stakeholders should explicitly
and publicly acknowledge that native land (including Crown Schedule A and B
lands) is the exclusive property of the Fijian landowners and accordingly the NLTB
in consultation with the landowners alone should have the right to determine when,
how or if their land is to be leased.
• Government, political party leaders and all other stakeholders should explicitly
and publicly acknowledge the debt owed by both the Nation and the tenant
communities to the landowners for their sacrifice in having surrendered the use of
their land under ALTO and ALTA at less than commercial rates of returns and
further publicly acknowledge the right of the landowners to receive a fair and
commercially determined rate of return on lands they will allow for leasing.
• Government should expeditiously put in place amendments to the current provisions
of ALTA to allow new agricultural leases over native land to be outside the ambit of
ALTA. At the same time, NLTB should publicly announce its assurance to the tenant
community that those, whose leased land will not be required by the landowner for
their use will be offered rolling leases under NLTA. Government and political party
leaders should explicitly and publicly acknowledge that Fijians have traditional
and customary ownership rights.
• NLTB should publicly announce that together with Government and in consultation
with the Fijian landowners native land will be made available for resettlement.
Government and political party leaders should explicitly and publicly announces
its full support, both in terms of resources and finance, to NLTB to enable it to make
available land for resettlement both in rural, urban and peri-urban areas.
• Government and political party leaders should explicitly and publicly acknowledge
that Fijians have traditional and customary ownership rights over land below high
water mark referred as their qoliqoli and that the Fijians should be rest assured that
Bills shall be introduced conferring such rights to the Fijian owners.
• Government and political party leaders should explicitly and publicly acknowledge
that native land previously acquired by Government for public purpose and are
currently used for purpose other than for public purposes be immediately returned
to the original owners.
PROPOSED SUGAR INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING AND LAND CONFLICT IN FIJI
97
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 18 Number 1 May 2003 © Asia Pacific Press
7 Goodwill payments, although illegal under
ALTA, have always been paid by tenants. In
the past these usually were equivalent to
about one year ’s rent. In 1999–2000, the
goodwill (or New Land Consideration fees,
as goodwill has recently been referred to)
charged by NLTB ranged between F$2,000
and F$22,000 per lease (Lal et al. 2001a). A
similar amount has also been paid to the
landowners for giving their ‘consent’.
8 These figures differ from those reported in
Lal et al. (2001a), although both were derived
from NLTB. According to the Manager,
Information Technology, NLTB, the differ-
ence is due to different cut-off dates used to
determine when the leases expired.
9 Proposed sugarcane quality payment, as in
the case of the Australian system, would
reward growers and millers for their
respective efficiency gains over and above
some benchmark, and penalise them
according to their efficiency losses. Despite
the growers and the miller agreeing in 2002
to implement such a system from the
following crushing season, according to Mr
Gerald Barrack this has been deferred for at
least another year (Fiji Times, 19 February
2003). While the growers are still in support
of the introduction of the sugarcane quality
payment system (Sugar Cane Growers’
Council 2003); it appears that the miller has
changed its position on this.
1 0 Expected net returns are determined by
multiplying the probability and the net return.
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